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Caught in a Trap: The European Union
Leghold Trap Debate
Peter V. Michaud
In 1991, the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers1
passed a regulation 2 concerning traps used to catch wild ani-
mals. 3 The regulation prohibits persons in EU nations from us-
ing leghold traps4 or trapping methods that do not meet
"internationally agreed humane trapping standards."5 Annex i
of the regulation lists the animal species included in the prohibi-
tion.6 The regulation also bans the importation of pelts and
1. The institutions of the European Community include the Council of
Ministers, the European Parliament (which has the power to recommend laws
and limited power to amend or veto Council legislation), the Commission (which
creates "bills" submitted to the Council) and the Court of Justice (which inter-
prets EU law). DAVID MEDHURST, A BRIEF AiD PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EC LAw 17
(2d ed. 1994). The Council, as a legislative body, considers bills proposed by the
Commission. Id. Decisions require a qualified majority of the Council for pas-
sage which means that each member country has a weighted vote (e.g., the
United Kingdom has a weighted score of 10 and Belgium has a weighted score
of 5). Id. at 18.
2. A regulation can be passed either by the Council or the Commission.
Id. at 19. Unlike directives, which allow each member state to enact the law as
it sees fit, regulations are binding and directly applicable to each of the member
states of the EU. Id. at 22.
3. Council Regulation 3254191 Prohibiting the Use of Leghold Traps in
the Community and the Introduction Into the Community of Pelts and Manu-
factured Goods of Certain Wild Animal Species Originating in Countries Which
Catch Them By Means of Leghold Traps or Trapping Methods which Do Not
Meet International Humane Trapping Standards, 1991 O.J. (L 308) 1 [hereinaf-
ter Regulation].
4. The regulation defines "leghold trap" as a "device designed to restrain
or capture an animal by means of jaws which close tightly upon one or more of
the animal's limbs, thereby preventing withdrawal of the limb or limbs from the
trap." Id. at art. 1.
5. Id. at annex i.
6. Annex i of the regulation lists the following species to which the regula-
tion applies: beaver, otter, coyote, wolf, lynx, bobcat, sable, raccoon, musk rat,
fisher, badger, marten and ermine. Id.
Members of the fur industry note that the fox and the mink are two ani-
mals curiously missing from the list of protected animals. Bud Jorgenson, Kohl
Stroked on Fur Trade: Canada's Soft-Sell Approach Differs from U.S. Sanctions
First, Dialogue Last, Attitude, FIN. PosT, June 20, 1995, at 1. European trap-
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other goods 7 originating in countries that allow the animals to
be caught by means of"leghold traps or trapping methods which
do not meet international humane trapping standards."8 If a
country allows either the use of leghold traps or "trapping meth-
ods which do not meet international humane trapping stan-
dards," that country cannot export any fur into the EU.9
January 1, 1995, was the designated date of the regulation's
implementation.' 0 By July of 1994, however, the EU Commis-
sion decided that the development of international humane
trapping standards would not be completed until late 1995.11
Therefore, the Commission enacted a regulation postponing the
effective date of the regulation until January 1, 1996.12
In late 1995, the EU Commission unanimously voted to fur-
ther postpone the effective date of the regulation for another
year until January 1, 1997.13 The EU Parliament, however, is
opposed to any further postponement of the regulation and
wants it enforced immediately. 14
In this controversy, the EU Commission claims it has au-
thority to delay the implementation of the leghold trap regula-
pers trap these animals extensively for their fur and are not subject to the ban.
Id.
7. Annex ii defines "other goods" as: "other raw hides and skins (fresh, or
salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-
dressed or further prepared), whether or not dehaired or split, other than those
excluded by note 1(b) or 1(c) to chapter 41"; raw furskins (whole with or without
head and including heads, tails, paws or other pieces or cuttings) assembled
and unassembled; and "articles of apparel, clothing accessories and other arti-
cles of furskin." Regulation, supra note 3, annex ii.
8. Regulation, supra note 3. The regulation states that "the abolition of
the leghold trap will have a positive effect on the conservation status of
threatened or endangered species of wild fauna both within and outside the
community." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The International Standardization Organization (ISO) is the interna-
tional body which is attempting to develop the standards. Fur Flies Over Euro-
pean Pelt Ban EC, NEw SCIENTST, Apr. 13, 1996, available in WESTLAW,
EURONEWS database.
12. Commission Regulation 1771194 Laying Down Provisions on the Intro-
duction Into the Community of Pelts and Manufactured Goods of Certain Wild
Animal Species, 1994 O.J. (L 184).
13. Danny Penman, Americans Oppose EU Fur Ban, LONDON INDEPEND-
ENT, Dec. 15, 1995, at 4.
14. Id. The European Parliament voted to oppose the EU Commission ac-
tion by a vote of 262-46. Id. On June 19, 1996, the Parliament, by a vote of 407-
33, demanded immediate implementation of the EU ban. Vote in European
Parliament Could Renew Dispute Over Fur, 13 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 26,
at 1066 (June 26, 1996).
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tion because it is a trade matter and therefore within its
jurisdiction. 15 The EU Parliament, on the other hand, claims
that the leghold trap regulation is an environmental matter and
thus falls under its jurisdiction.' 6 If this dispute is not resolved,
it will ultimately be heard by the European Court of Justice.' 7
Contrary to the EU Commission's Decision, the Netherlands
announced that it will not abide by the Commission's postpone-
ment and stated that the leghold trap ban became effective
within its territories as of January 1, 1996.18 It is unclear at
this time whether other European countries will feel forced to
"take matters into their own hands" over the leghold trap issue
given the numerous implementation delays.
Conflict over the EU leghold trap ban has existed since the
EU Commission first proposed the regulation in 1991. Animal
activist groups support the ban, arguing it prevents cruelty to
animals. The world fur industry, including aboriginal tribes
who trap animals, as well as free trade supporters, believe the
ban contravenes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) as a discriminatory restriction on trade.' 9
Part I of this Note examines leghold traps, explains the im-
petus behind the proposed EU leghold trap regulation, and de-
scribes the rationale of the interest groups supporting the
leghold trap ban. Part II explores the rationales of the groups
opposing the ban. Part III discusses WTO/GATT involvement
and explores step-by-step how a WTO/GATT dispute panel may
address the leghold trap issue. Part IV discusses possible alter-
native solutions to a leghold trap dispute panel and alternative
measures which are GATT-compatible. Part V concludes that a
solution acceptable to all parties is unlikely to be found.
I. INTEREST GROUPS SUPPORTING THE EU LEGHOLD
TRAP REGULATION
Leghold traps are steel traps consisting of a powerful spring
"jaw" which fur trappers open into a circle and set in the wild. 20
15. Penman, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Fur Imports Banned, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 12, 1996, at B1.
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT]. See
Pressure Mounts on EU over Planned Fur Imports Ban, ENVTL. WATCH W. EuR.,
Oct. 7, 1994, available in WESTIAW, EWWE database.
20. KEITH E. JACKSON, ILL. LEGISLATIE COUNCIL, LEG-HOLD TRAP LEGIsLA-
TION: U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM FILE 9-295 (Sept.
3Mivi. J GLOBAL TRADE
The trappers place bait within the steel circle. When an unsus-
pecting animal happens upon the trap, the steel spring activates
and the trap closes on the animal.21 Often the trap only catches
the animal by a limb and does not kill it immediately. These
trapped animals die painfully from exposure, shock, thirst or
loss of blood. 22 A study of the Canadian fur industry revealed
that in 1986-1987 4.85 million animals were caught in leghold
traps and an estimated 600,000 "chewed off their own limbs in
desperate attempts to escape."23
Given the high probability of animal suffering, most animal
activists condemn the use of leghold traps. 24 As early as 1863,
British naturalist Charles Darwin spoke out against these
traps, stating that they are "a system which consigns animals to
acute agony, probably of eight to ten hours duration before it is
ended by death."25 Modern animal activists argue that "leghold
traps inflict unnecessary pain and anxiety on animals, both
physically and mentally."26 These activists claim that many fur
trappers are negligent in checking traps on a regular basis and
trapped animals often spend days in needless agony as a re-
sult.27 Activists also argue that even animals in frequently
monitored leghold traps unduly suffer the severe pain of broken
skin and crushed bones. 28 As a result of this widespread opinion
against leghold traps, at least five states in the United States
now ban these traps, and several other states restrict the size of
20, 1982). "Steel jaw leghold traps were invented in the 1820s... Approxi-
mately 50 models of leghold traps are available. They differ in their quickness,
strength, concealment, weight, and jaw characteristics, with different versions
designed for capturing different animals." M. LYNNE CORN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE, THE STEEL JAW LEGHOLD TRAP: ISSUES AND CONCERNS, 93-356 ENR 3
(1993).
21. CORN, supra note 20.
22. CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMANE TRAPPING, TRAPPING AND CAN-
ADA'S FuRBEARERS (1983).
23. Animal Welfare Groups Campaign Furiously for Fur Ban, Eur. Info.
Service, July 19, 1995, available in WESTLAW, EURONEWS database. "In or-
der to hold the animal securely [in a leghold trap], substantial pressure must be
kept on the captured leg. Frantic efforts to escape the torment and stress of
capture cause further injury by tearing tendons and other tissue." ANIMAL PRO-
TECTION INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, THE LEGHOLD TRAP: HARVESTER OF TORMENT
(n.d.).
24. CORN, supra note 20, at 2.
25. Animal Welfare Groups Campaign Furiously for Fur Ban, supra note
23.
26. CORN, supra note 20, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3.
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leghold traps allowed. 29 More than sixty countries worldwide
also ban the use of leghold traps within their borders.
30
Numerous animal welfare31 , animal rights3 2 and anti-fur
associations 33 support the EU leghold trap regulation. 34 These
associations argue that the EU regulation should take effect im-
mediately. They contend the use of leghold traps is indefensible
since more humane traps are available for hunters to use.
35
Animal activist groups also note that despite eight years of
effort, the International Standardization Organization (ISO)36
has failed to define "humane" trapping standards. 37 These
29. CORN, supra note 20, at 6. The five states which have a limited ban on
leghold traps are Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island and South
Carolina. Id. at 2. Bans in these states only allow the use of leghold traps "by
property owners or in situations involving health hazards, destructive
furbearers, or other 'animal problems'." Id. Thirty-six other states have re-
strictions on leghold traps prohibiting trapping in certain areas (e.g., near a
residence); requiring trappers to check set leghold traps periodically, ranging
from 24 to 96 hours; requiring the trappers' name and address to be on every
set leghold trap and limiting the number of leghold traps an individual trapper
can set. Id. at 4-5. Some states also limit the use of steel "teeth" on leghold
traps. Id. at 5. In addition, Massachusetts had a complete leghold trap ban
initiative on its ballot in the 1996 general election. Massachusetts Groups Seek
Ban on Animal Traps, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 26, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, BANGDRON database.
30. CORN, supra note 20, at 5. For instance, 24 countries in Africa ban the
leghold trap (19 of these 24 countries ban all trapping). JACKSON, supra note
20, at 8. Other countries which have total bans on leghold traps include Brazil,
Costa Rica, India, Israel and 11 countries in Europe. Id. at 9. In addition, such
countries as France, Italy, and three states within Australia have limited bans
on leghold traps. Id.
31. Animal welfare groups have been defined as groups which "strive to
legislate humane and ethical treatment of both wild and domesticated ani-
mals." CORN, supra note 20, at 3 n.6.
32. Animal rights groups not only share many of the same beliefs as animal
welfare groups, but also "oppose any nonessential human use of animals." Id.
33. Anti-fur groups believe that animals should not be raised or trapped for
the eventual purpose of using their fur as a garment. Phillip J. O'Connor & Jim
Casey, Anti-Fur Group Admits Arson, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993. One
commentator argues that "removing animals from a population interrupts the
social structure, resulting in more movement among survivors and increased
ranging for mates," resulting in "predation of livestock" and the spread of dis-
ease. Michael Markarian, Editorial, Our Ecosystem Can Get By Quite Nicely
Without Trappers, Thank You, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at D2.
34. Among those groups which have voiced support for the EU leghold trap
regulation include the Eurogroup for Animal Welfare, the International Fund
for Animal Welfare and the World Society for the Protection of Animals.
Animal Welfare Groups Campaign Furiously For Fur Ban, supra note 23.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 11.
37. Id. The ISO has also decided to exclude the words "without cruelty"
from the trapping standards. Britain Under Flak For Delays In Fur Import
Mi J GLOBAL TRADE
groups argue that such prolonged equivocation proves there is
no "humane" way to trap and kill an animal.38 The Scientific
Veterinary Committee, which advises the European Commis-
sion, believes the ISO will inadequately define "humane" and er-
roneously legitimize many inhumane traps.3 9 In addition,
animal activist groups claim that the ISO is a "technical" group
only concerned with "efficiency, not ethics."40 Opponents of the
ISO also assert that the experts who serve on the "humane" trap
committee are members of the fur trade, i.e. trappers/hunter
organizations.41
Finally, animal activist groups are concerned that further
delay of the EU regulation could "be used as a toehold toward
undermining current environmental, conservation, or animal
protection laws ... in contravention of prior assurances that no
such use of [GATT] would be made."42 Environmentalists argue
that increased participation is needed by all environmental
groups in creating trade policies since "[tloo often agencies re-
sponsible for foreign policy have clear priorities (for example,
diplomatic relations, balance of trade, or the promotion of U.S.
goods and services) that supersede environmental objectives." 43
Legislatures thus often develop trade policies with an eye to-
wards increased trade volume at the expense of environmental
concerns.4 Ultimately, animal activists fear that important en-
vironmental objectives, such as preventing the undue suffering
of animals at the hands of trappers, will be brushed aside by the
powerful voices of the groups opposed to the regulation.
Ban, Eur. Info. Service, July 5, 1995, available in WESTLAW, EURONEWS
database. Many supporters of the leghold trap ban say that this shows that it is
impossible to trap at all "without cruelty." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ISO Not Competent to Judge the Cruelty of Traps, Say Lobby Groups,
Eur. Info. Service, Jan. 19, 1994, available in WESTLAW, EURONEWS
database.
41. Id.
42. 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 20, at 876 (May 17, 1995). The Humane
Society of the United States authored the letter along with 21 environmental
and animal welfare groups voicing their concerns. Id.
43. Frona M. Powell, Environmental Protection In International Trade
Agreements: The Role of Public Participation in the Aftermath Of the NAFTA, 6
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109, 125 (1995).
44. Id.
[Vol. 6:355
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II. OPPONENTS OF THE EU LEGHOLD TRAP
REGULATION
Members of the fur industry, major fur-exporting countries,
aboriginal tribes, and free trade supporters oppose the EU
leghold trap regulation. 45 These groups claim the EU leghold
trap regulation will devastate the fur industry and those who
depend on it for their livelihood, in contravention of free trade
principles.
A. THE FUR INDUSTRY AND MAJOR FUR EXPORTING COUNTRIES
Major fur exporting countries include Canada, the United
States and Russia.46 In addition, many Asian countries import
raw fur pelts from these countries, turn the pelts into garments,
and export the finished garments to the EU. 47 These countries
allow at least limited use of leghold traps and claim that their
fur exports would severely decline by implementing the EU
regulation.48
Canada and the United States are openly opposed to the EU
leghold trap ban and have vowed to fight its implementation. 49
Canada has threatened to bring an action under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).50 The United States
has stated that it will support such action in the newly created
World Trade Organization (WTO).51 In addition, the United
States may take separate action under Section 301 of the Trade
45. Pressure Mounts On EU Over Planned Fur Imports Ban, ENVTL.
WATCH W. EUR., available in WESTLAW, EWWE database.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text (explaining the regulation).
49. U.S. Fur Industry Readies Petition Against EU Over Ban on Fur Im-
ports, 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 37, at 1575 (Sept. 20, 1995).
50. GATT, supra note 19.
51. U.S. Fur Industry Readies Petition Against EU Over Ban on Fur Im-
ports, supra note 49, at 1575. The WTO is a new organization which came into
being January 1, 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round, the latest round of
international trade negotiations under the GATT.
The GA IT is a multilateral agreement with a common goal of reducing
trade barriers and restrictions among the member countries. See GATT, supra
note 19, pmbl. & art. I. This reduction of trade barriers addresses both tariff
and non-tariff restrictions to trade. Id. arts. II, III & XI.
Even if Canada requests a dispute panel from the WTO, the process will be
long; some say at least nine months. Jorgenson, supra note 6, at 1. Therefore,
if the ban does go into effect before a WTO/GALTT panel has heard the dispute,
the fur industry will be hurt for many months before the issue is even decided.
36iw J GLOBAL TRADE
Act of 197452 and impose trade sanctions independently against
the EU. 53
Canada and the United States argue that the EU leghold
trap ban would have a serious negative impact on their econo-
mies. The fur trade industry in Canada is particularly large. In
1994, fur and furskin goods exported from Canada totaled Cana-
dian $194 million.54 Canada exports approximately 75% of its
fur to the EU. 55 The Canadian fur industry employs approxi-
mately 100,000 people. 56 In 1983, the "fur industry contrib-
ute[d] about [Canadian] $600 million to the Canadian GNP."57
United States figures are equally impressive. An EU leghold
trap ban would cost "U.S. businesses more than $4 billion a year
and result in the loss of more than 200,000 American jobs."58
Fur trappers oppose the ban citing a lack of adequate alter-
native traps.59 Trappers claim that the leghold trap is the most
effective, versatile and reliable trap available and therefore the
least expensive to use.60 In addition, alternative traps, like the
Quick-kill trap which instantly kills the animal by "deliver[ing]
a lethal blow to the animal's vertebrae or skull" with two steel
scissor-like rectangles, are a more dangerous threat to non-tar-
get pets and children.61 Fur trappers contend the leghold trap is
a necessity of the industry because of the unavailability of a
safe, effective and cost-efficient alternative. They argue that a
52. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2411, 2415 (Supp. V 1975) (cur-
rent version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1994)). The Trade Act of 1974 provides
for trade sanctions against countries engaged in unfair trade practices. Id.
53. U.S. Fur Industry Readies Petition Against EU Over Ban, supra note
49. The Fur Information Council, the International Association of Fish and
Wildlife Agencies, the National Trappers Association and the Fur Merchants
Association will soon file a petition under Section 301 asking the United States
to instigate trade sanctions against the EU. Id. at 1574.
54. Jorgenson, supra note 6.
55. Helen Branswell, Canadians Take Message to Europeans That Trap-
ping is Humane, EDMONTON J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A12.
56. Jorgenson, supra note 6. About 85,000 of these people are trappers
while the remaining 15,000 are in the fur processing and garment industries.
Id.
57. CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMANE TRAPPING, supra note 22.
58. An Embargo on American Fur Products, 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No.
21, at 911 (May 24, 1995).
59. See U.S. Fur Industry Readies Petition Against EU Over Ban On Fur
Imports, supra note 49.
60. CoRN, supra note 20, at 2. For instance, the Aldrich legsnare trap, de-
veloped in 1962, and the Novak legsnare, developed in the 1970s, provide a
more humane way to kill an animal; however, trappers consider such traps inef-
fective. Id. at 4-5.
61. Id. at 3.
362 [Vol. 6:355
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complete ban on the use of the leghold trap would devastate the
fur industry.
B. ABORIGINAL TRIBES
Aboriginal tribes would be severely affected by a EU leghold
trap regulation. Such tribes commonly use leghold traps to cap-
ture animals sold for fur.62 The Native Canadian tribes of Cree
and Inuit claim that their entire way of life will be irreparably
harmed by the EU leghold trap regulation.63
For many aboriginal tribe members, trapping is more than a
cultural activity; it is a significant source of income. Many
aboriginals involved in the fur industry have no transferable
skills to begin a new career.64 Thus, a ban on leghold traps will
have an effect similar to that felt by Aboriginal Canadians when
an EU whitecoat seal ban went into effect in the mid-1980s.65
As a result of that ban, the combined income of Northwest Terri-
tories seal hunters fell from Canadian $900,000 in 1981 to
62. Brittan Under Flak For Delays in Fur Import Ban, supra note 37.
63. Rosemarie Kuptana, newly elected President of the Inuit Cicumpolar
Conference (ICC), has stated that the ICC will formally protest the EU regula-
tion to the EU Parliament. Inuit Name Canadian Leader as New President,
Associated Press Political Service, July 31, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS database. The ICC is the international organization of Inuit, repre-
senting Inuit people in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Russia. Id. In Canada,
the majority of the Inuit live in the eastern Arctic region of the Northwest Ter-
ritories. Groups of Inuit also live along the coastlines of Quebec and Labrador.
John Bissonnette, Canada's Aboriginal Peoples, 23 CAN. TODAY/D'AUJOURD'HUI 1
(1993). Approximately 45,000 Inuit live in Canada, totaling 1/4 of the world's
Inuit population. Id.
In 1991, an estimated one million persons belonged to the Aboriginal popu-
lation of Canada, including Indians, Inuit and Metis. Id.
Aboriginal Canadians already face grim news regarding the fur industry.
In 1993, the value of wild fur pelts in Canada dropped 63%. Cynthia Osterman,
Trappers Harvest Slim Profits, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 19, 1995, at D6.
64. Anita Christoff, Editorial, Fur Protest Brings Destitution to Natives,
CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 20, 1994, at A5. Northwest Territories' Dene national
chief Bill Erasmus, who holds the Assembly of First Nations' wild fur issue
portfolio, has stated:
The impact of the anti-fur movement has been enormous. Our people
are destitute. Just over a short number of years a tremendous culture
shock has been forced upon them. Some of our people can't speak Eng-
lish as well as they'd like to; western ways are completely alien to
them. They were equipped to live off the land, but now have lost their
livelihoods. They're lost when they go into town. Many people don't
understand and expect them to instantly amalgamate into Canadian
society.
Id.
65. Id.
363
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$17,000 in 1989.66 The leghold trap regulation would be the sec-
ond piece of EU legislation to have a direct negative impact on
Canadian native tribes. 67 Given the available data on the wide-
spread economic loss felt by Canadian Aboriginals as a result of
the EU whitecoat seal ban, it is not an exaggeration to predict
that a leghold trap ban could result in economic devastation to
large groups of aboriginal tribes.
Supporters claim that aboriginal fur trappers are "scram-
bling" to comply with the potential EU regulations. Buying al-
ternative types of traps and learning to use them "is difficult for
the financially strapped trappers."6  Placing overwhelming im-
portance on the painless killing of animals may ignore the seri-
ous plight of aboriginal tribes.69 One commentator has stated
that "[if too many more people begin believing that animals are
more important than humans, then Canada will literally go to
the dogs."70
At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, member nations adopted a declaration which
stated as its first principle: "[hiuman beings are at the centre of
concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature."71 This
statement concentrates on the health and life of humans, rele-
gating nature to a secondary role.7 2 Supporters of aboriginal
tribes state that allowing the EU regulation to go into effect
would ignore this principle.7 3 Furthermore, aboriginal tribes
trap animals which are plentiful. Thus, they have the role of
"watching over the wilderness and monitoring animal popula-
tions."7 4 Therefore, focusing on the interests of aboriginal tribes
does not necessarily neglect environmental concerns. 75 Aborigi-
nal tribes "obviously have a direct interest in protecting wildlife
habitat and are very conscious of keeping balance in nature."76
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992).
72. Id.
73. See Christoff, supra note 64.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Linda Lundstrom, Canadian designer).
In the Inuit culture, "[a] hunter who abuses or who fails to show respect to
the animals he takes will not be successful in the hunt. Failure in the hunt is
failure in life." Nancy Doubleday, Aboriginal Subsistance Whaling: The Right
[Vol. 6:355
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Similar concern for the needs of aboriginal tribes occurred
as a result of international whaling regulations implemented in
1946.7 7 The international whaling restrictions excepted certain
species of whales hunted by aboriginal tribes in order to avoid
destroying the tribes' livelihood. 7  Thus, the whaling treaty rec-
ognized "that a human right to cultural heritage may conflict
with an animal species' right to survival."79 The aboriginal ex-
ception to the whaling restrictions recognized the need to sus-
tain the culture of aboriginal tribes.80
In recent years, many world organizations have voiced their
support for indigenous persons' rights. Trade regulations affect-
ing aboriginal persons adopted by countries without aboriginal
input conflict with this growing support.81 The United Nations'
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations states that the aboriginal right to self-determina-
tion is "linked to a number of rights whose recognition [wa]s vi-
tal to the survival of an indigenous population, such as the right
to develop its own culture, its own language, its own traditions
and its own way of life."82 The EU leghold trap regulation may
be an infringement of this right.
of Inuit to Hunt Whales and Implications for International Environmental Law,
17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 373, 391 (1989).
77. Stephen M. Hankins, Comment, The United States' Abuse of the Ab-
original Whaling Exception: A Contradiction in United States Policy and a Dan-
gerous Precedent for the Whale, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 489, 493 (1990). The
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946 Convention) was
a treaty signed by 15 major world nations and addressed restrictions on whal-
ing activities. Id. at 490-91.
78. Id. at 493-94. In addition, recent debate has focused on Norway's re-
sumption of commercial whaling. Clay Erik Hawes, Norwegian Whaling and
the Pelly Amendment: A Misguided Attempt at Conservation, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 97 (1994). Norway has argued that "whaling is an important means of
livelihood for Norway's small coastal communities" and although the whaling
industry is not of great economic importance to Norway per se, "it is of great
importance to the families and local communities involved.' Id. at 112-13.
79. Hankins, supra note 77, at 529.
80. Id. But see id. at 522 (theorizing that the United States used the ab-
original whaling exception for its own economic and political advantages).
81. Maureen Davies, Aboriginal Rights in International Law: Human
Rights, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW: INDIAN, METIS AND INUrT RIGHTS
IN CANADA 745 (Bradford W. Morse ed., 1989).
82. Id. at 756. But cf Hankins, supra note 77, at 522 (arguing that by
allowing exceptions based on "cultural dependence" on the whale by aboriginal
tribes sets a precedent for other nations to argue "cultural dependence" and
gain an exception).
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C. FREE TRADE SUPPORTERS
Free trade supporters oppose the ban and align themselves
with the fur industry and aboriginal trappers. They contend the
EU leghold trap ban hinders the free movement of goods and
restricts access to foreign markets.8 3
Despite the fact that EU trappers must also observe the
leghold trap ban, non-EU countries face an undue burden and
discrimination. For trappers to sell any fur to the EU, all
leghold trap use must be banned within a country.8 4 This is
true even for leghold traps used on animals whose fur is not des-
tined for the EU. Therefore, in order to sell fur to the EU, a
trapper must quit all leghold trapping even if the versatile, cost-
efficient leghold trap could be used for sales of fur within his
home country. This may force the cost of fur to rise not only in
the EU but in every market since less cost-efficient traps must
be used 100% of the time.8 5 Many argue that, in effect, the re-
sult is "the imposition on its trading partners of the EU's views
of public morals" at an economic cost to all societies involved.86
Domestic fur purchasers could face higher prices as a result of
the EU's view of what is and is not acceptable.
Canada and the United States have threatened retaliation
against the EU if the leghold trap regulation is implemented.
The most likely course of action is a GATT complaint against the
EU by Canada, with the support of the United States.
III. WTO/GATT DISPUTE PANEL ACTION CONCERNING
THE LEGHOLD TRAP REGULATION: ONE
POSSIBLE ANALYSIS
A. THE ARGUMENTS
If Canada files a complaint with the WTO, it could argue
that the EU leghold trap regulation is a violation of GATT Arti-
83. Alexandra Haner, Will the European Union Packaging Directive Recon-
cile Trade and the Environment?, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 2187 (1995). In addi-
tion, many developing countries claim that environmental regulations are only
protectionism and "are designed to increase manufacturing costs, thereby re-
stricting their access to the markets of developed countries." Id. at 2191.
84. Regulation, supra note 3.
85. A similar incident was at issue concerning the beef hormone dispute
between the United States and the EU. The prohibition of hormone-treated
beef imports to the EU could have resulted in an increase in beef prices
domestically.
86. EU Taken to Task in Meeting of Trade Policy Committee, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), No. 30, Aug. 2, 1995 (quoting Chris Marcich of the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative).
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cle XI's prohibition of the imposition of "quantitative restric-
tions" on imports into a country or trade area. 87 The argument
would be that prohibiting importation of any fur from a country
which allows leghold traps is a quantitative restriction imposed
by the EU.
A similar and relevant dispute, concerning tuna fishing,
was addressed by two past GATT dispute panels which are usu-
ally referred to as TUNA 188 and TUNA 1189. TUNA I and II
involved, respectively, the 1991 allegation by Mexico, and the
1994 allegation by the EU and the Netherlands, that the United
States' Marine Mammal Protection Act violated the GATT.90
Similar to the EU leghold trap regulation, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act restricted the importation of all yellowfin tuna
into the United States from countries that allowed their fishing
industry to catch tuna using methods which resulted in high
dolphin mortality rates. 9 1
B. THE FINDINGS OF TUNA I AND II
Both the TUNA I and II panels concluded that neither Arti-
cle III nor the Article XX exceptions applied and therefore, the
87. Article XI of GATT provides that:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 19, art. XI.
88. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna, BISD 39th Supp. 155 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594
(1991) [hereinafter TUNA I].
89. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter TUNA II.
90. The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) protects "certain species
and population stocks of marine animals [that] are, or may be, in danger of
extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1361
(1988). Mexico argued that the disputed restriction was a quantitative restric-
tion in violation of Article XI of GATT, and the United States argued it was an
internal restriction allowed by Article III of GATT. Thomas E. Skilton, GATT
and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for
an International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 468 (1993).
91. Commercial fishboats in many countries used a method known as "set-
ting on dolphins". Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities
for GATT-compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247,
249 (1996). The boats would locate schools of yellowfin tuna by finding schools
of dolphins. Id. The fishermen would then encircle the dolphins with a purse
seine net, in which inevitably many dolphin would become entangled and even-
tually die. Id.
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tuna embargo violated the quantitative restrictions of Article
XI.92 The TUNA I panel concluded that the tuna ban related to
a method or process by which tuna was caught outside of the
United States and was therefore outside the scope of internal
regulation allowed by GATT.93
C. A STEP-BY-STEP ANALYSIS OF THE GATT PANEL FINDINGS
IN TUNA I AND II
1. The Article XI Argument: Quantitative Restrictions
The TUNA I and II panels concluded that the tuna embargo
could not be considered "duties, taxes or other charges" allowed
under GATT, and therefore was a quantitative restriction in vio-
lation of Article XI. s4 Since the EU leghold trap regulation is a
quantitative-type restriction (i.e. no fur can be imported into the
EU if the exporting country allows leghold traps), a dispute
panel, following TUNA I and II, could find that the EU regula-
tion also violates Article XI of GATT.
2. The Article III Argument: National Treatment
In response to Mexico's argument that the tuna restriction
violated Article XI, the United States argued that the restriction
was allowable under Article III of GATT. Article III allows a
country to impose regulations on imported products if the im-
ported products are accorded "national treatment": "treatment
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin."95 In arguing that imported tuna was accorded national
treatment, the United States noted that the American tuna in-
dustry was equally burdened by the restriction.9 6 Similarly, the
EU could argue that the leghold trap ban would apply equally to
EU countries and therefore would not violate the "national
treatment" clause in GATT.
The TUNA I and II panels analyzed the United States' Arti-
cle III claim and decided that Article III did not apply to the
cases. The panels held that Article III only addresses the regula-
tion of products as products, not the process by which they are
produced.9 7 Similarly, in the leghold trap dispute, the EU is at-
tempting to regulate the process by which fur-bearing animals
92. TUNA I, supra note 88, 5.18.
93. Id. 5.25.
94. Id. 5.18; TUNA II, supra note 89, 5.10.
95. GATT, supra note 19, art. III.
96. TUNA I, supra note 88, 3.19; TUNA II, supra note 89, 3.93.
97. TUNA I, supra note 88, 6.2; TUNA II, supra note 89, 5.8.
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are trapped. A GATT/WTO panel could conclude that the EU
regulation is not covered by Article III, citing the product/pro-
cess argument of TUNA I and II.
Despite the TUNA I and II panel decisions which reject al-
lowing a country to regulate the process by which a product is
"created", this type of restriction is used frequently. Current
laws of many nations, including the United States, address
animal "production" processes that ultimately affect human con-
sumption. 98 In addition, a multilateral trade agreement regu-
lates the treatment of many types of endangered species. 99
Other animal regulations address the conservation of certain
animals, such as the International Whaling Commission's regu-
lation of whale catches. 100
The EU leghold trap regulation is not the first restriction
imposed by a country to regulate the treatment of animals. The
U.S. Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act' 01 requires all
meat sold or imported into the United States to have been
slaughtered in a "humane" way.10 2 However, the EU leghold
trap regulation has raised the first international dispute con-
cerning such extraterritorial restrictions based on inhumane
treatment of animals.
98. See, e.g., U.S. Import Milk Act of 1927, 21 U.S.C. § 142 (1988) (gov-
erning the process by which dairy cows are kept and milked).
99. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (CITES).
CITES currently has 113 parties. Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade,
Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 535, 581 (1992). Since "the intent of CITES is to alleviate trade-
driven pressures on a species, its trade-related provisions are necessary to the
achievement of its goal." Id.
100. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green To Global: Toward The Transformation
Of International Environmental Law, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 250 (1995).
Nations which participated in the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling set up a supervisory body to regulate the harvesting of whales,
which were in danger of becoming extinct. Id.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1988).
102. The Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act states, in part, that
"[n]o method of slaughtering [livestock] or handling in connection with slaugh-
tering shall be deemed to comply with the public policy of the United States
unless it is humane." Id. The Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act
states that for livestock killing to be humane, the livestock "[must be] rendered
insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other
means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast,
or cut... " Id.
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3. The Article XX Argument: Exceptions
If a WTO panel finds that the leghold trap regulation does
not accord "national treatment" under Article III, but is instead
a violation of GATT Article XI, the EU would have to argue that
the regulation falls within the legal exception to Article XI.
GATT allows a country to violate Article XI if it has a valid rea-
son as outlined in Article XX.. 03 In TUNA I and II, the United
States claimed Article XX exceptions under section (b),10 4 an ex-
ception necessary to protect animals, and section (g),105 an ex-
ception necessary to conserve an exhaustible natural
resource.10 6 Given the similarity between the tuna/dolphin and
leghold trap issues, the EU could also attempt to claim exception
under the same sections.
a. Article XX findings in TUNA I and H
The TUNA I panel found that the Article XX exceptions only
apply to the acts of a country to protect humans, animals and
plants within its boundaries and, therefore, did not address the
validity of the Article XX claims.' 0 7 In contrast to the TUNA I
panel's findings, the TUNA II panel concluded that it is possible
to extraterritorially apply the Article XX exceptions.' 08
In addressing Article XX sections (b) and (g), the TUNA II
panel used a three-step analysis in determining the validity of
the exception claim.' 0 9 First, the TUNA II panel addressed
whether the policy in question fell within the range of policies
addressed by the Article XX exception. 10 Second, the panel ad-
dressed whether the policy was "related to" the exception and
103. See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX. As long as a country's measures are
not "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade", a country may argue any of ten
exceptions to the requirements of the GATT agreement. Id.
104. National laws are permitted which are "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health." Id. art. XX(b).
105. National laws are permitted which are required for the "conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunc-
tion with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." Id. art. XX(g).
106. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 874 (1995).
107. TUNA I, supra note 88, 5.27.
108. The panel held that based on past GATT decisions, GATT provisions
and general international law, a member country can invoke the exceptions of
Article XX even if the policy in question does not pertain to the area within the
country's territorial boundaries. TUNA II, supra note 89, 5.20, 5.33.
109. Id. 5.12.
110. Id.
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whether it was effective "in conjunction" with restrictions on do-
mestic production and consumption.'11 The panel, relying on
past decisions, decided that "related to" and "in conjunction
with" meant "primarily aimed at."112 Finally, the panel looked
at whether the policy was applied in a "manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
among countries where the same conditions prevail or in a man-
ner which would constitute a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade."113
Upon analyzing these three steps, the TUNA II panel held
that the United States' tuna restriction was neither "primarily
aimed at" nor "strictly necessary for" the protection of dolphins
and therefore was invalid despite the possibility of extraterrito-
rial application." 4 The panel reached this conclusion after not-
ing that the United States banned all tuna imports from
countries which did not follow the same process in catching their
tuna as the United States and therefore was too indirect and
overbroad. s5 The TUNA II panel concluded that the United
States, in pursing valid environmental objectives which affected
the world, could not accomplish these objectives by using trade
barriers to force another country to change its internal
policies. 16
Similarly, the EU ban would prohibit all fur from a country
which allows any use of leghold traps. In other words, even if
the fur being exported to the EU was trapped by humane stan-
dards, the EU would not allow the fur into the Union if any fur
is trapped by inhumane methods in the exporting country.
b. Article XX(g) & the EU leghold trap ban
In a WTO/GATT leghold trap dispute, the EU may invoke a
section (g) exception. The EU would first have to prove that the
policy was meant to conserve an "exhaustible natural resource"
and was made in conjunction with "restrictions on domestic pro-
duction and consumption." Although in TUNA I and II, dolphins
were not in immediate danger of becoming extinct, many were
being needlessly killed because of yellowfin tuna fishing meth-
111. Id.
112. Id. U 5.21, 5.22 & 5.23.
113. Id.
114. TUNA II, supra note 89, 5.42.
115. Id. 1 5.36.
116. Id. 1 5.39.
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ods. 117 The issue in the leghold trap dispute, unlike the tuna-
dolphin dispute, is not if one should kill an animal based on con-
servation issues, but rather, how one should kill an animal.
While the tuna embargo intended to save the lives of animals,
the leghold trap only bans one method of killing animals. Trap-
pers can still kill the animals as long as they use an approved
method.
Ironically, the text of the EU leghold trap regulation states
that the abolition of these traps "will have a positive effect on
the conservation status of threatened or endangered species of
wild fauna both within and outside the community."118 The EU
regulation, however, does not attempt to conserve an exhaustible
natural resource. It only attempts to regulate the process in
which the resource is "extracted."" 9 In regards to a section (g)
exception, the EU leghold trap ban does not even seem to pass
step one of the TUNA II three-step analysis.
c. Article XX(b) & the EU leghold trap ban
The EU could also attempt to justify the ban under a section
(b) exception.' 20 The EU would have to prove that the ban is
necessary for the protection of "human, animal or plant life or
health."' 2 1 Under the first step of the analysis used by TUNA II,
the EU would have to prove that the ban on leghold traps is nec-
essary for the protection of animal health since the ban does not
protect animal life; the animal is still allowed to die.' 22 De-
pending on how the word "health"123 is defined, a WTO/GATT
dispute panel may or may not conclude that the purpose of the
ban on leghold traps is to protect animal "health." The dispute
117. One article has stressed that, contrary to many commentators, the
tuna/dolphin dispute is not merely an animal welfare issue since it cannot be
claimed that "the slaughter of over seven million dolphins by the fishery since
the late 1950s is not a serious conservation problem." William J. Snape, III &
Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching For GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are "Pro-
cess Standards" Getting "Due Process?", 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 777, 783 (1994).
118. Regulation, supra note 3.
119. One could hypothesize that the inclusion of such language was either to
appease animal rights groups or to ward off future GATT actions by other coun-
tries against the EU.
120. GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b).
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
123. One definition of "health" is: "1. the general condition of the body or
mind with reference to soundness and vigor.... 2. soundness of body and mind;
freedom from disease or ailment." THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY
609 (rev. ed. 1982). Such a definition may include pain experienced by an
animal while trapped in a leghold trap.
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panel would have to conclude that by limiting the amount of
pain an animal experiences as it is being killed, one is acting to
protect the animal's "health."
Under step two of the TUNA II analysis of a section (b) ex-
ception, the leghold trap panel would have to determine whether
the ban is necessary for the protection of animal health.124 But,
as the TUNA II panel held concerning the tuna regulation, the
leghold trap ban would not be considered necessary since it only
directs a country to implement a policy which is compatible with
the EU's. 125 This is made clear by the EU requirement that all
fur imports from a country which allows the use of leghold traps
within its borders would be prohibited from importation, not just
the fur trapped by inhumane methods. On this issue, the TUNA
II Panel noted:
If however Article XX (b) were interpreted to permit contracting par-
ties to impose trade embargoes so as to force other countries to change
their policies within their jurisdiction, including policies to protect liv-
ing things, and which require such changes to be effective, the objec-
tives of the General Agreement would be seriously impaired.
1 2 6
Thus, to allow the EU to force other countries to follow its
own policies concerning humane trapping in order to import fur
into the EU would impair the objectives of GATT, including the
elimination of trade barriers. The TUNA II decision suggested
that it is possible to invoke an Article XX exception extraterrito-
rially, provided a country does not impose its policies on other
nations. The leghold trap ban, however, would impose EU poli-
cies on exporting countries unless the ban only prohibits the im-
portation of inhumanely-trapped fur, rather than all fur from
these nations.
Ultimately, even if a WTO/GATT leghold trap dispute panel
adopted the reasoning of TUNA II, the section (b) exception of
the leghold trap regulation would fail on the second step. The
EU would be forcing other countries to adopt its own policies.
This was disallowed by the TUNA II panel in regards to the
United States' tuna regulation.
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. According to TUNA II,
"necessary" is defined as whether or not another reasonable measure which is
not "inconsistent with other GATT provisions" exists. TUNA II, supra note 89,
5.35.
125. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
126. TUNA II, supra note 89, 5.38.
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4. The paradox of environmental protection under the GATT
The environmental policy imposition by one country on an-
other country is not in itself GATT-incompatible. 127 Unfortu-
nately, most often, the only way to give such a policy "teeth" is to
impose trade import and/or export restrictions in order to force
another country to comply.128 At that point, the policy becomes
GATT-incompatible.1 29
On the other hand, not allowing a country to regulate the
products it imports is also incompatible with GATT's primary
goals. 130 If GATT forbids a country to enforce those environ-
mental policies it considers important through import restric-
tions, the country may be left powerless to regulate an activity
which concerns its citizens. 1 1 In effect, the "collective morals"
of the regulating country cannot be adequately addressed. 132
If a WTO/GATT leghold trap panel follows the TUNA I and
II decisions, it would probably find a violation of GATT. If this
happens, the future of environmental support by the WTO/
GATT may be bleak not only for animal rights and welfare activ-
ists but for all environmental groups. A decision against the EU
would signal a definite stand by the WTO/GAIT against envi-
ronmental actions and regulations which affect unrestricted
trade in the world.133 A WTO/GATT stand against the leghold
trap restriction would seemingly limit a nation's environmental
regulations by allowing their application only within the coun-
try's borders. Such was the holding of the TUNA I panel.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
If the ban goes into effect as scheduled, it is likely that more
wild animals will be raised on large "fur farms." Given the cur-
rent conditions of "fur farms", such an occurrence could result in
continued mistreatment of animals. Instead of allowing an
animal to roam free in the wild its entire life with the possibility
that it will be caught in a leghold trap and suffer the last few
127. Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 117, at 780.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 783.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream":
Globalization and Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 205 (1995). Bernabe-Riefkohl argues that the GATT's approach to
unilateral restrictions is inadequate because unilateral restrictions are an "ef-
fective way to address global environmental policies." Id. at 224.
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hours of its life, the animal will live on a fur farm where it suf-
fers its entire life in a small cage only to be eventually killed.
According to one commentator, animals raised on "fur farms"
spend "the majority of their lives in overcrowded, filthy, wire-
mesh cages before being killed by the cheapest - and cruelest
- methods possible: genital electrocution, poisoning or suffoca-
tion. Sometimes these methods only stun the animals and they
end up being skinned alive. 134 Thus, if the fur industry turns
away from leghold traps and focuses on "fur farms", the next
worldwide animal treatment conflict would then potentially in-
volve the regulation of these "fur farms."
Human instinct, however, suggests that any pain and suf-
fering by any living animal which can be avoided should be
avoided. Animal activists state that this should be an easy pol-
icy to follow since "more humane" traps are available.13 5 How-
ever, as discussed above, these traps are more expensive, more
dangerous to children or pets who happen upon them and, ac-
cording to many trappers, less effective. 136 In addition, the
leghold trap can be used in many environments to catch many
types of animals. 137 Currently, there is no one alternative trap
which is as versatile. 138 However, a group of Canadians, Ameri-
cans and Europeans are presently studying new kinds of animal
traps which could be comparable to the versatile, effective and
cost-efficient leghold trap.139
As a solution to the tuna/dolphin dispute, one commentator
proposed a regulation of the industry on a "boat-by-boat" basis.
Neutral observers would be placed on each tuna boat to insure
that the specific tuna crew is following the acceptable process.
This solution, however, is not realistic for the leghold trap
dispute. As discussed, much of the fur trapped in the world is
trapped in remote regions by small groups of indigenous tribes.
It would not be possible to implement the quantity of neutral
observers needed to "police" this area.' 40
134. Paula Moore, Foe of Fur, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1995, at 24.
135. See CoRN, supra note 20.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. U.S. Fur Industry Readies Petition Against EU Over Ban On Fur Im-
ports, supra note 49.
140. It would be unrealistic to assume that a "neutral observer" could assim-
ilate into the foreign and unique culture of an indigenous tribe who base not
just their employment on fur trapping but their entire lives on the fur trapping
process. In fact, the EU may face such a problem within its own borders.
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Another solution would be to use multilateral agreements to
address the leghold trap dispute. Multilateral agreements offer
"legitimacy", "harmonization of standards" and adequate "en-
forcement" of the regulations. 141 On the other hand, some com-
mentators have argued that it is unrealistic and improbable that
countries with such differing views on the issues of animal
rights, as well as what constitutes a "humane" trapping stan-
dard, could come to an acceptable agreement. 142 Furthermore,
it can be argued that multilateral agreements often encourage a
"race to the bottom", since "[s]tandards negotiated by a large
number of states must necessarily drop to the lowest common
denominator." 143 In addition, multilateral agreements could
also exclude indigenous tribes from the decision-making process,
a group which has a large stake in the solution.144 All countries
would need to make a conscious attempt to consider the views of
the indigenous tribes in their decision-making process.
The EU could attempt to regulate trapping standards by re-
quiring all fur to bear a label stating whether the animal was
trapped by "humane" standards. This approach would allow EU
consumers to decide on an individual basis whether they care to
support a specific company or fur-trapper based on its trapping
policy. American tuna companies were forced by consumer
groups to develop a similar labeling method (promoting
"dolphin-safe tuna)-a labeling method which consumers
widely praised.' 45 In addition, American consumers did not
seem bothered by the price increase of a few cents per can of
tuna in order to cover the costs of the project.' 46 Given the high
141. Dorothy J. Black, International Trade v. Environmental Protection: The
Case of the U.S. Embargo on Mexican Tuna, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 123, 151
(1992).
142. See generally id. (describing the criticisms of commentators).
143. Id.
144. "The Rio Declaration states that '[e]nvironmnental issues are best han-
dled with the participation of all concerned citizens . . . '." Dunoff, supra note
100, at 295 (emphasis added).
145. Tuna Without the Guilt: Canners Aim to Make the Seas Safer for
Cetaceans (Dolphins), TIME, April 23, 1990, at 63. Until tuna companies took
action, many consumers boycotted their product and refused to eat canned
tuna. Christine Gorman, Listen Here, Mr. Big! Corporate Misbehavior is Spark-
ing a Fevered Outburst of Consumer Protests and Boycotts, TIME, July 3, 1989,
at 40.
146. Tuna Without the Guilt, supra note 145, at 63. American Tuna Compa-
nies primarily harvested "dolphin-safe tuna" by switching from yellow-fin tuna,
which swim with dolphins, to skipjack tuna which do not swim near dolphins.
Fay Fiore, Activists Alarmed by Bid to Reverse Dolphin-Safety Law, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1995, at Al. Most foreign tuna fleets, however, still harvest yellow-fin
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price of fur garments in comparison to cans of tuna, it is unclear
without further studies whether such a "labeling project" would
be as widely accepted by consumers as was tuna labeling.
Given the success of "dolphin-safe tuna" programs, as well
as other "environmentally friendly" programs initiated by Amer-
ican corporations, American consumers have shown that they
are conscious of the environment and will support products
which are aimed at protecting it. 147 In a 1989 Gallup Poll, 90%
of American consumers surveyed said they exert extra effort to
purchase products from companies which try to protect the envi-
ronment.148 Given the consumer consciousness of environmen-
tally friendly products, proponents of fur trapping argue that
real fur is more environmentally friendly than fake fur which
"often is made from petrochemicals." 149 Anti-fur groups con-
sider such an argument dubious. 150
One potential flaw in the labeling approach may be that it
would be unrealistic for companies to be able to keep straight
which specific furs were trapped by which methods. In addition,
this solution would not help the aboriginal trapping problem
since demand for their fur, trapped by leghold traps, could ulti-
mately become non-existent if Europeans decide to support hu-
manely trapped fur.
Currently, the EU Commission is debating a recent propo-
sal which would exclude from the leghold trap regulation all fur
pelts trapped by indigenous persons as well as all products made
from indigenous tribe-trapped pelts. 151 This exception would in-
tuna but use fishing methods which are more dolphin-safe than methods used
previously. Id.
147. A recent article notes that free range turkeys (which are allowed to
roam in flocks outdoors as opposed to turkeys raised in small indoor cages) are
growing in popularity among turkey consumers and signal conscious consumer
trends towards humanely-raised animal products. Alternative Birds: Free-
Range Turkeys Are Catching On This Thanksgiving Holiday, Along With Other
Locally Produced Foods, Providing A Lift For The Farm Economy, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 21, 1995, at El.
148. Scott Hume & Patricia Strand, Consumers Go Green, ADVERTISING AGE,
Sept. 25, 1989, at 3.
149. Canada Trappers Struggle to Keep Fur Trade Alive in Northwest Terri-
tories: Depressed Prices and Anti-Fur Protests Have Hurt a Business Plied By
Many Eskimos and Indians, L.A. TIMEs (Orange County ed.) Mar. 14, 1995, at
D9.
150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
151. Europe Considers Exemption From Fur Ban for Natives; Proposal
Would Allow Indigenous Peoples to Use Leghold Traps, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec.
22, 1995, at All.
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clude approximately 40% of all fur trapped in North America.15 2
One European diplomat, however, has stated that such a propo-
sal is a "mockery of the ban" and "drives a coach and horse
through [the ban]."1 5 3 In addition, the exception, although solv-
ing the problems of the indigenous tribe trappers, would not ad-
equately address the concerns of other fur trappers as well as
free trade supporters.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the strong position of each side of the EU leghold trap
dispute, it is doubtful that an amicable resolution can be
reached. In addition, postponement of the leghold trap regula-
tion, now scheduled to be implemented three years later than
originally planned, has only caused each side to dig their heels
in deeper.
Regardless, given the TUNA I and II decisions, it is doubtful
that a WTO/GATT dispute panel could adequately resolve the
leghold trap problem without either allowing the EU to enforce a
regulation inconsistent with GATT or further alienating envi-
ronmental groups. Therefore, the parties involved may need to
seek a solution outside of the GATT dispute settlement process.
Given the tension between the parties involved, as well as the
inability of the WTO to adequately address the problem, the
leghold trap debate appears to be caught in a trap.
152. Id.
153. Id.
378 [Vol. 6:355
